cmupress.th@gmail.com
Abstract The eventful month of March 1971 is very momentous in the history of liberation war of Bangladesh. Because, that month witnessed the commencement of liberation war and declaration of independence of Bangladesh, which was the then East Pakistan. Following the declassified documents from the National Archives, Surry, UK, this research examines the views of British diplomats to that March events of 1971. The documentation of the military crackdown on the night of 25 March 1971 in East Pakistan by the British diplomats has taken a good portion of this research. This study argues that, while Pakistan Army was denying the massacre of 25 March, British diplomats who were non-partisan and their reports on this situation is documental evidence of Pakistan Army’s cruelty. In addition, the aggressive and obstinate manner of the Pakistan government is overt. These reports are also significant as it helped the British government to frame their policy.
Keywords: Diplomat, 25 March 1971, Pakistan, Britain, British High Commissioner.
Introduction
March 1971 is the most crucial part of the liberation war of Bangladesh. Therefore, any discussion regarding the liberation war of Bangladesh cannot but mention that month. In fact, the military crackdown of 25 March of 1971, undertaken by Pakistan Army, led the Bengalis to declare the independence of Bangladesh. Other countries including big powers also followed that successive development with a keen observation by taking a direct or indirect role to this crisis. The British archival documents project that even after having a neutral role, Britain was not indifferent to the issue. As a non-partisan and third party, the official telegrams of the British diplomats would help to create an objective history on Bangladesh liberation war as well as their understanding of the March events. In that sense it will give a new insight to the Bangladesh liberation war scholarships.
Literature Review
Attention of the outside world specially the role of big powers (USA, USSR, India and China) towards this war have taken space on some researches (Budhraj, 1973, 482-495; Jackson, 1973, 35-50; Sidky, 1976, 965-980; Azad, 2006; Pilkington, 2011, 451-474; Haque, 2014; Hossain, 2006), where British role is almost absent. Again, often without access of classified documents, role of the Bengali immigrants in Britain to that war (Tazul, 2001), the British perspectives and publicity regarding 1971 (Harun, 1995), role of Bengali newspapers published from Britain at that time (Faruq, 2002) has become the subject matter of some researches. Using the archival materials few researches also have been conducted on the issue of 1971. Angella Debnath in her study paid attention on the British perception of the East Pakistan crisis with only a brief description of March (Debnath, 2011: 421-450). The study of Janice Musson concentrates on British recognition process to the new state of Bangladesh in 1972, where the March events got less priority (Musson 2008: 125-144). Again, Smith in his study focus on the British policy making process on that crisis criticizing British ‘winning side’ approach (Smith, 2010: 451-470). Masuda Bhatti (Bhatti, 2010) translated 110 British documents from English into Bengali without any interpretation, where some telegrams of March 1971, written by different British diplomats have been included. So, those works reflect different or very specific side of the crisis where the March issue has not been explicitly addressed. Unavailability of the declassified materials would be a major cause. So, there is an ample scope to explore on this issue.
Objective and research question
Detailed study focusing on the specific issue related to the attitude of the British diplomats towards the March events of 1971 in East Pakistan is very scarce. So, the objective of this study is to find out the attitude of British diplomats towards the March events. Here, the research question is ‘‘What was the attitude of the British diplomats towards the March events that occurred in 1971 in East Pakistan?’’ To get the answer of the research question this paper offers a chronological record of those turmoil days and views of British diplomats to the massacre occurred in the month of March 1971 through their sending telegrams to FCO (Foreign Commonwealth Office) and other British High Commission Offices. Special emphasis has been given on the military crackdown of 25 March 1971. Discussion has been confined only to those British diplomats who were serving at that time (1971) in India, Dacca[1] (now Bangladesh) and Pakistan.
[1] The present spelling of Dacca is Dhaka.
Materials and methods
Contemporary archival documents act as a very important source to reconstruct or analyse historical event which mark authoritativeness of that very history. For conducting the research and to reconstruct the history of Bangladesh liberation war, British archival materials such as Prime Minister official report (PREM), Cabinet papers (CAB), Hansard House of Commons (HC) debate, Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) report, Dominion Office (DO) files have been consulted. Contemporary newspapers also have been taken as an important source. Descriptive and analytical method has been followed in this research.
Historical Backdrop
Before proceed to the discussion regarding the view of British diplomats to the March days of 1971, it is imperative to get the foundational idea about its pre-history. The partition of British India (1947) led to the creation of India and Pakistan. The eastern part of Bengal[2] became East Pakistan in 1947 by joining in Pakistan state. The Bengalis of the Eastern part eagerly wanted to be sided with Pakistan rather than India for its common religion. But religion alone could not cement the ties. So, it did not take long time to the Bengalis to understand that it was another colonial rule of Pakistani edition. The disparity in each sector (Chottopaddhay:1971; Bangladesh, 1972: 41-53; Jahan,2001:11; Niaz, 2010:11; Sobhan, 2015:263) made Bengalis bitter towards West Pakistan. The economic, social, cultural as well as political disparities between the two parts of Pakistan provided an impetus for national movements. The cultural and linguistic superiority was harboured by the West Pakistani elites which led to the language movement of 1952. Later Bengalis voiced their discontent in the Provincial election of 1954. In 1966, the movement for provincial autonomy by six-point programme of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was the direct outcome of the resentment against the central government of Pakistan. Later, Ayub khan stepped down in 1969 by a mass violent upsurge (Rahman,1981; Documents, 1972). All those movement extended a pronounced weakness in the strength unity of Pakistan. Finally, 1970 election acted as a catalyst in the growth of separate state. In this election Awami League of East Pakistan won all but two seats in the National Assembly (Baxter,1971:197-218; Talbot,1998: 194-201). So, it was obvious that the newly elected Constituent Assembly would be convene at Dacca and Mujib would form a government. But events were moving on reverse position. Rather than handing over power to the democratically elected party, on 1 March 1971, the Pakistani authority postponed the Assembly meeting for an uncertain period, which was to be held on 3 March 1971. Dacca was instead brutally attacked by the Pakistani military on the night of 25 March 1971. From very 26 March the Bengalis severed all links with West Pakistan; East Pakistan declared its independence, thus sparking off the Bangladesh liberation war. These turmoil events were witnessed and observed by the British diplomats who were at that moment serving in Pakistan and its neighbour country India. This mounting political unrest did not leave the British diplomats of this region untouched.
[2] The formerly known East Bengal became East Pakistan in 1955. After achieving independence in 1971, it became officially known as People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
Political development of East Pakistan before 1971: Observation of British diplomats
Generally, a diplomat represents his state to the host country. Morgenthau compares the diplomatic representatives with eyes, ears and mouth of their own government. According to him, the diplomats fulfil the symbolic, legal and political functions for their government and maintain the ‘two-way traffic’ between the centre and the outside world (Morgenthau,1950:42). Among other things one of their tasks is ‘reporting and gathering of information by all lawful means on conditions and developments in the host country for the sending government’ (Britannica, 2009: No.164602). As part of their role the British diplomats also did their job faithfully and sincerely in the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The Foreign Commonwealth office (FCO) deals the issue of foreign affairs of Britain. The British diplomats work under the supervision of FCO and FCO gets the information and suggestions of the related countries through those diplomats. Thus, diplomats play a vital role in making British policy on international crisis and so did in the events of Pakistan in 1971.
In accordance with official protocol, the British diplomats who were serving in the British High Commissions in that region, informed the related Department (FCO) about the various issues of this area even before the crisis started. Eventful period of 1960s which had a profound impact on the subsequent political development of Pakistan had been closely observed by the British diplomats of this region. They witnessed how the tension reached its peak between the two wings. General negligence of West Pakistan to East Pakistan recorded in their telegrams. In all spheres of developmental activities East Pakistan was neglected by the Pakistan government. Economic development was disproportionately regional. Official statistics under-reported the problem. A British official survey in 1970 found anomalies between the data submitted by the central Government of Pakistan and their own observations about the East wing of Pakistan. They reported that:
There are substantial statistical uncertainties in assessing population, agricultural production and employment trends in East Pakistan. Our impression is that the situation is generally worse than is indicated by official central Government figures (FCO) 37/705; 2 April 1970).
These official surveys and observation of the situation gave an idea to the British diplomats that in the long run, East Pakistan would separate. Some also described it as an ‘artificial constructed country’ (FCO 37/705: 3 February 1970; FCO 37/876 :2 March 1971). Even before 1971 in June 1969, the British Deputy High Commissioner to Pakistan, Roy Fox, assumed the worst and told the US Consul General in Dacca that, ‘I foresee the breakup of the country as a result of Mujib winning the elections which Yahya would be forced to call as a result of political pressure’ (Khan, 1999:274-75). Thus, British diplomats predicted the possibility of a split between the two wings of Pakistan.
In fact, their prediction was not far off. A series of events threatened to split Pakistan. Yet British diplomats believed that after the election of 1970, the tension between East and West Pakistan would be settled by the transition of power to a democratic Government who had received convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the population in the election. British files described the victory as ‘sweeping’ (CAB 128, CM (70),45th Conclusion: 10 December 1970). But the political tension increased rather than decrease. As Sir Cyril Pickard, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan noticed:
The elections solved nothing. The very success of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, made him a prisoner of his own extremists and the lesser success of Bhutto in the West confronted him with an opponent, less interested in a constitutional settlement than power through the ruin of Mujib (FCO 37/870: 21 May 1971; FCO 37/ 876, No. 239: 6 March 1971).
British diplomats begun to predict the trend of future events in Pakistan, particularly the more or less gradual growth of resistance from the Bengalis. They even got hints of the preparation of the Pakistan army to suppress the uprising with the cost of several thousand Bengali killings (FCO 37/876: 2 March 1971). Even after a serious turn of events, in the first two months of 1971 British diplomats were optimistic that an escalation of the violence would be avoided and the East Pakistan-West Pakistan contacts would be resumed (FCO 37/876, No.71: 5 March 1971). The political tension increased rather than decreased. It was fairly clear to the diplomats that events were moving towards a deep crisis.
Situation reports of diplomats on early March 1971
The deteriorate situation of East Pakistan made the diplomats endeavoured in information gathering. The diplomatic postings of Dacca, Islamabad, Calcutta and New Delhi apprised London regularly about the situation. In spite of communication disruptions and restrictions on their mobility, the British diplomats tried to collect as much information as possible through different sources. As the Pakistan news media were in tight control, it was difficult for the diplomats to get a balance picture. So, the British High Commission in Islamabad directed the Dacca High Commission to keep in touch with other well-informed missions (FCO 37/876, No.71:5 March 1971). The Martial law authority of Pakistan had forbidden the diplomatic wireless transmission on 25 March. Even at that time of information blackout, the British diplomats in Dacca had been able to communicate secretly from emergency transmitters (Debnath,2011:428). In building up the general picture of East Pakistan, they sometimes collected information from other sources and later confirmed it by the experienced one (FCO 37/876, No.239: 6 March 1971). Thus, huge information on the crisis was sent to London.
After arriving in London, all the reports went directly to the South Asian Department (SAD) of the FCO. Later considering on their importance, the duplicates were sent to additional Foreign Office departments, the Cabinet Office, the Intelligence Assessment Unit and the office of the Prime Minister at 10, Downing Street. At least twenty offices and hundred people saw the telegrams (Debnath, 2012:17). Important copies of telegrams and regular ‘Pakistan situation reports’ were sent to the British Prime Minister Edward Heath. The intelligence briefings were put together for the Prime Minister by the South Asian Department. Prime Minister signed these documents, often putting remarks on their borders. The situation of Pakistan was taken seriously by the FCO and FCO opened Emergency unit in South Asian Department (FCO 37/877: 16 March 1971; FCO 37/880: 31 March 1971). By establishing such unit, FCO made sure to have all telegrams and information from the concerned British High Commissions.
The diplomats were busy giving situation reports of Pakistan to FCO. By this time the events in East Pakistan were turning out in a more serious way by the declaration of President Yahya of postponing the Assembly meeting in 1 March 1971. The declaration produced an all-out non-cooperation movement. But still the British diplomats hoped that in his speech of 6 March 1971, the President of Pakistan would announce the new date and would give Mujib some room for skilful management (FCO 37/876, No.236:6 March 1971). But Yahya by his address did not seem to have done this. From Dacca, the Deputy High Commissioner, F. C. D. Sargeant, in his telegram more bluntly criticized the manner of Yahya as ‘belligerent and uncompromising’ (FCO 37/ 874: 6 March 1971; FCO 37/876, No.236: 6 March 1971). Diplomats guessed the likely result of the action of Pakistan President on East Pakistan. In fact, the postponement of the meeting (3 March 1971) of the National Assembly of Pakistan for an indefinite time heightened tension and it had an electrifying effect. Telegrams of the diplomats reported on a general strike, business and industry at a standstill, shops closed, schools and colleges closed, the roads devoid of vehicles, railways halted, PIA flights grounded (FCO 37 /876: 2 March 1971). The telegraph and radio links were disrupted following the call of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for a campaign of non-co-operation with the governmental authorities. These telegrams depicted a clear picture of a pretty strong vote of support for Sheikh Mujib. By this time the invitation of the President Yahya Khan to attend a round table conference was refused by Mujib. The situations were worsening in East Pakistan and curfew was imposed in many towns. British diplomats predicted that disruption of commerce would bring rapid increases in prices and non-availability of many commodities (FCO 37/ 876, No. 75: 6 March 1971). Indeed, this was already so. In other cable it was said that, mail and commercial cables from abroad were not being received. Hence orders and production were falling. Supplies of goods were becoming scarce (FCO 37 /877, No. 89: 10 March 1971). Citing Waymer, a BBC official, account was summarized by the British High Commission in Islamabad, which supported the similar line of Dacca. Waymer found the Dacca airport under military control in the first week of March (FCO 37 /876: 2 March 1971; FCO 37/876, No. 239: 6 March 1971). In their telegrams the diplomats depicted how the curfew and the widespread disturbances affected the economy of Pakistan. In fact, those reports confirmed that the situation in Dacca was very grave.
The situation had been further deteriorated by a civil disobedience movement launched on 7 March 1971 by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, from his hugely crowded Dacca Racecourse speech, for which most Bengalis were waiting for. Before that day, (6 March) President of Pakistan, on his broadcast speech put most blame to political leaders. So, on the following day when civil disobedience programme had declared it was not surprising to diplomats. Rather diplomats criticized antipathy of President to political leaders and his uncompromising manner (FCO 37/876, No. 75: 6 March 1971). On the contrary British diplomats praised Mujib for his skilful game of not crossing the Rubicon of UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) as many of his party wish. To describe Mujib’s hold on East Pakistan they wrote “it was the Sheiks writ that ran in East Pakistan and not that of the President and the central government” (FCO 37/876, No. 239: 6 March 1971). Indeed, Mujib was in full control of Dacca. From Dacca the Deputy British High Commissioner F. C. D. Sargeant, informed the Islamabad British High Commission that a combination of civil disobedience, strikes and the Awami league directives had caused a serious loss of productivity. So, the financial and economic situation had become extremely precarious (FCO 37/880: 18 March 1971). In fact, events of the first two weeks of March gave the diplomats a notion that East Pakistan had become a less safe place than it was before. In the meantime, diplomats got direction from Foreign Commonwealth Office to seek interview with the Pakistan President but not act as an intermediary between him and Mujib (FCO 37/877, No. 185: 11 March 1971). They were directed to do so from the thought that the scope for action by British government was limited and diplomatic intervention would be ineffective. They also considered that intervention would be contrary to their interests. So, they wanted to persuade the President in the direction of a negotiated settlement. But no persuasion did work.
Records of causalities in different towns and reinforcement issue
A game of negotiation was designed to show noble intention of President Yahya Khan to eliminate the crisis. On 9 March 1971, announcement came that President would come to East Pakistan and within 6 days on 15 March, he came there to show off negotiation with Mujib and it continued till 25 March without reaching to a solution. By this time many incidents took place which was recorded in the reports of the British diplomats. The reports described that the disturbance in Chittagong and other towns had been widespread. Some parts of the British Council Library in Dacca were damaged. Reports were coming to the diplomats that other parts of Dacca also attacked. Following firing between the army and civilians, curfew was imposed on 20 March in Jaydevpur, a town about 22 miles north of Dacca. The causalities were heavy and people were died. The British reports told that at least three people were killed with injuries on both sides (FCO 37/878, No. 152: 20 March 1971). These incidents were discussed in detail in the narrative of Major Safiullah and Rafiqul Islam (Safiulla:2005; Islam:2002).
The situation in Chittagong was more serious by the incident of MV Swat of the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation. From Dacca, Sargeant reported that the Swat had been lying at Chittagong since 28 February, unworked by the port because it was believed that it contained arms. But Head of the Chittagong port authority, Commodore Malik told that, the ship contained only five cars of army officers and a supply of arm boots and rations. As the stevedores continued to withhold their labour to unload, attempt was made to start to work the ship by the army at the night of 24/25 March. Hearing the news, a mob blocked all roads between the Chittagong Cantonment and the harbor (FCO 37 878, No. 167: 25 March 1971; The New York Times, 30 March 1971:1). The British Officials collected information about the Chittagong port from a witness, LIoyd, who was working as a Consulting Engineer in Sir Bruce white and Partners Company. He told that, trouble started in Chittagong on 23 March when the Bengalis confronted army personnel attempting to unload the Swat. Firing broke out, large numbers of the Bengalis were headed in its direction and road blocks went up (FCO 37/895, 8 April 1971).
The Pakistan Army made good use of time allowed by the protected talks between Mujib and Yahya. In the name of negotiation by this time, large reinforcements were flown in from West Pakistan to the East wing to overcome the Bengali resistance. Anthony Mascaranhas in his book claimed that from 2 March to 24 March, 12,000 army came to East Pakistan from West Pakistan (Mascaranhas:1971). According to other study, on 25 March the Pakistan Army was strengthened by 80,000 troops flown from the West Pakistan (Malik et al, 2008: 247). The British diplomats reported that, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) Boeing flights were bringing troops with plain clothes. Citing a Ceylon press report, they told that 32 Pakistan military aircraft had stayed in Ceylon since trouble begun in East Pakistan. But Pakistan claimed that so far only two battalions had been sent over (PREM 15/ 567: 28 March 1971). An assessment of the reinforcement supply capability from West Pakistan to East Pakistan was prepared by the British High Commission of Islamabad. It showed that the PIA schedule provided for 23 Boing 707 flights from Karachi to Dacca each week and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) C130’s supplied flights at the rate of two per day which were capable to lift via Ceylon about 5,000 troops or 800 tons freight per week. If all the PIA aircraft and all the C130’s were used of troop reinforcement BHC estimated that 2,500 troops could be transported in one day assuming a 75% availability rate. Again, by sea there were sufficient merchant and the PN ships to provide almost unlimited reinforcement, though the sea trip took 8 to 10 days. There were six merchant ships on regular run from Karachi to Chittagong (FCO 37/880, No. FOB301230Z: 30 March 1971). This estimate collecting from reliable sources by BHC easily dismiss the claim of Pakistan of bringing only two divisions. So, the studies that claimed the number of 12,000 to 80,000 were not an exaggeration.
British diplomats reported that, on 31 March 1971 four flights had brought troops from West Pakistan (FCO 37/880, No. FOB 010140z: 1 April 1971). Other reports confirmed that, “the PIA Boeing fleet and three Fokker’s in East Pakistan were carrying certain types of ammunition as well as troops. The Pakistan Government was heavily reinforcing their troops in the main centres. At least 15,000 troops were estimated to have arrived since mid-March” (PREM 15/568: 7 April 1971; CAB 128/49, 21st conclusions: 22 April 1971). In another report, they gave information that, the communication route also affected and the army itself was facing a logistic communications problem. The Deputy High Commissioner of Dacca, Sargeant commented, “now the army begin to realise that they have perhaps bitten off more than they can chew” (FCO 37/880, No. FOB 010140z :1 April 1971; FCO 37/884, No. 331: 20 April 1971).
Reinforcement also came from the sea. A battalion of troops, tanks and ammunition was carried by the Ocean Endurance. Both in the Navy and Air Force the numbers of the Bengali crews were minimal and they were not trusted to West Pakistani authority. This distrust of all Bengalis extended to the armed forces and naval forces as well. So, in the Pakistan Navy, the Bengali crews had been removed from ships and put on shore duty. Similarly, the PIA had sent 80 ground crew to East Bengal since no Bengali was allowed to handle the aircraft. Even Durrani, (Chairman of PIA) had obtained a guarantee from the President of Pakistan that the PIA’s losses would be covered (FCO 37/884, No. 102: 19 April 1971; PREM 15/568, 8 April 1971).
Those entire reinforcement programmes made the stage easy for a planned massacre by the Pakistan Army. Of course, ‘Operation Searchlight’ was not the first crackdown on the Bengalis. Prior to this, another operation, called ‘Operation Blitz’ was planned. ‘Operation Blitz’ was designed in December 1970, by the then Martial Law Administrator, General Yaqub, which was approved at a high-level meeting with President Yahya, on 2 February 1971 (Gerlach, 2010:128; Salik, 1977: 39-40). Later, they fulfilled their plan to attack the Bengalis with ‘Operation Searchlight’ on 25 March 1971.
Military crackdown of 25 March night and after
Unarmed Bengali people were attacked and killed by the Pakistan Army on that night of 25 March under ‘Operation Searchlight’. In some researches the number of dead people at Dacca city had mentioned approximately 15,000 (Chowdhury,1984: 31). Although British files did not record the total number of Bengalis killed at that night, official telegrams gave the figure as being 5,000 in Dacca with another 3,000 in Chittagong (PREM (Prime Minister’s Office report) 15/567; 28 March 1971). The other districts and rural areas have been excluded from this data. Almost every telegram received in London reported that the army acted in a ‘ruthless and punitive fashion’ (CAB 128/49: 1 April 1971; PREM 15/567, 26 March 1971).
In their reports the diplomats illustrated the terror caused by the Pakistan Army. At the beginning of the crisis the Pakistan Army was in full control in Dacca as well as in other parts of East Pakistan. Reports told that Radio Pakistan, Dacca had been taken by military on 26 March. Lockouts and strike were prohibited. No foreigner and Foreign Mission in East Pakistan were allowed to distribute leaflets without permission (FCO 37/878, No. 391: 26 March 1971). The SAD made a situation reports largely based on Dacca telegrams which were sent by Major Cox, Assistant Military Advisor and F. C. D. Sergeant (BDHC). They reported that a total curfew was imposed by the Pakistan Army from 26 March. The troops got the order to have fired as anyone venturing on the streets. Wireless was forbidden by the martial law authority. Even the existence of the telegrams they were sending was highly confidential. The diplomats commented that discipline and controls of the troops was very poor, instances of callous disregard for life with looting, burning and random shooting were actively seen. The British High Commission building in Dacca had not been attacked but an army detachment disarmed and removed the police guard. The British Council deputy representative, who was in the office at that time, was unhurt although his car was gutted. The British Deputy High Commissioner of Dacca, Sargeant commented that “the army has planned a reign of terror and that it has so far been largely successful” (PREM 15/567, No. 412: 29 March 1971; PREM 15/ 567: 19 April 1971). Most of the telegrams delineated the similar picture.
The British diplomats tried to collect the information about 25 March night from the eyewitness. Through a British journalist they had known that an Austrian wife of an employee at the Intercontinental Hotel, Dacca, left hotel on 29 March on foot to see the condition in town, but she had eventually turned back by armed army officer. She saw unarmed civilian bodies in street being piled up prior to disposal. Another one was an English-speaking Czech, who was working as advisor to Jute mill in Chittagong, left on 29 March and by military aircraft arrived at Karachi on 30 March. He said shooting had gone on for some days and some buildings were destroyed; the harbour was not working and ships were standing off (FCO 37/880, No. 441, 4 April 1971). Describing it as ‘widespread killing of unarmed civilian’ F. C. D. Sargeant, the Deputy High Commissioner to Dacca, wrote:
One of my local staff has had his house looted and now only has the cloths on his back. Fourteen others (some of them Hindus) are missing …. Troops apparently killed all the teachers and their families in one Dacca university block of flat. Shooting the locks off the doors and mowing down those insides. Butchers sleeping in their shops in new market were shot as they slept (FCO 37/880, No. 199: 31 March 1971).
Some of the teachers of same flat who escaped from that killing and other teachers who went through this experience and witnessed the killing described the similar account in their memoirs. (Rahman: 2002; Kabir,1972; Chowdhury, 2011)
From Islamabad, in a cable of 29 March 1971, British High Commissioner Sir Cyril Pickard anxiously wrote that:
In Dacca the army moved into the city at midnight of the 25 March. A series of explosions were followed by several gun battles lasting the whole night and continuing on a diminishing scale throughout the whole of the following day. Dacca has been entirely isolated. Indications are that the Army has planned a reign of terror and that it has so far been largely successful……...the Pakistan army is acting with callous disregard for life and is adopting terror tactics to cow the Bengalis. Political leaders are being hunted down and shot (there is no precedent in Pakistani history) and I expect to find that much of the Awami League leadership has been eliminated (PREM 15/567, No. 412: 29 March 1971).
Eyewitness reports were also included to describe the killing of large numbers of students at Dacca University. F. C. D. Sargeant (the Deputy High Commissioner to Dacca) wrote:
A member of my staff who went there last Saturday was shown a mass grave in front of the building with bulldozer tracks. People were killed quite indiscriminately in most parts of the town and there were numerous bodies lying in the main street, dead bodies are floating in the river and nine truckloads of bodies have been buried at the municipal rubbish dump (FCO 37/880, No. 199: 31 March 1971).
The Panjabi troops slaughtered the Hindus, in particular, in large numbers. The Biharis (Urdu speaking people who emigrated to East Pakistan from the Indian province Bihar after 1947) and other locally-recruited people[3] had taken the opportunity to crush Bengalis by joining with the army. In some telegrams diplomats wrote on their looting, burning and beating up Bengalis. They also added that, in Pallabi, Mirpur, Muhammadpur and many other parts of Dacca, the Biharis carried out their operations (FCO 37/880, No.199, 31 March 1971; PREM 15/568, 1 April 1971). Such activities by Biharis were continuing after the March events. The British High Commissioner of Dacca, reported:
Armed Bihari irregulars continue to do the work of the army, terrorising the Bengalis and slaughtering the Hindus. As I write this dispatch, reports reach me daily of continued killing on a large scale, of wanton destruction of villages and of widespread looting. (FCO 37/888: 5 June,1971).
[3] Razakar, Al–Bodor, Al Sams were paramilitary forces composed of pro–Pakistani Bengalis and were against of Bangladesh independence and worked as local guides for the Pakistan army.
Not only the capital of East Pakistan that was attacked but also rural areas like Barisal, Madaripur, Tangail, Madhupur etc. had to face the similar fortune (FCO 37/887, No. 390: 19 June 1971). Diplomats also collected that information.
In these circumstances, British officials planned to evacuate British nationals[4] from East Pakistan. FCO officials declared in a news conference that although no firm preparatory measures had been taken, evacuation arrangements were planned through Singapore and the ship The Clan Macnair, which was available at that time in Chittagong harbour (FCO 37/880: Verbatim service, 101/711:1 April 1971). The British Prime Minister Edward Heath, had read the regular situation reports in Pakistan with interest. He asked to confirm the FCO to obtain the fullest possible accounts from evacuees who arrived in London (FCO 37/895: 9 April 1971). Prime Minister Edward Heath read about the continuing situation in Pakistan and as he heard that the evacuees were coming, he ordered officials to take a full account of what was taking place in Pakistan.
[4] The total number of British citizens in East Pakistan at that time was 904, of these 611 in Dacca and Chittagong and the remaining 293 in outlying area, of whom almost one half were in the tree plantation of Sylhet (FCO 37/876, from Sutherland to Collins of Pakistan Emergency Unit, 3 March 1971).
Interview of evacuees taken by the British intelligence
Following the official order, British intelligence interviewed evacuees, focussing on those who seemed reliable. A. J. Collins of Dacca High Commission and who later worked on Emergency unit (SAD) interviewed some British citizens in April who escaped from different parts of East Pakistan in different ways. Interviewed in London on 1 April, Miss Le queens of the Baptist mission in old Dacca, confirmed that the villages on the bank opposite Dacca had all been burnt. In her statement she described the condition of the minority community of East Pakistan. She told that, in the old town some 300-400 Hindus were in Saint Gregory’s Catholic School and the army took as many as they could put in one truck to Jagannath College where they were all shot (FCO 37/895: 16 April 1971). The Hindus of East Pakistan, branded by the Pakistani army as ‘the enemy of the country’, were targeted and killed extensively and these reports proved it.
Mr. Longwill, the former Head of the James Finley and Company office in East Pakistan, left Dacca on 28 March. Longwill was also the President of the UK Association of Pakistan. He told that, Iqbal Hall and other Hall of residences of Dacca University and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) headquarters were attacked. He believed that nearly 100 were dead. He also added that most inexcusably punitive expeditions were sent down into old Dacca and killed a lot of people (FCO 37/895: 8 April 1971). Graham Halt, field manager of Hunting technical services, he and his wife Elizabeth Halt had a rough time in March and April. They were trapped at Bogra when fighting broke out on 25 and 26 March. After unpleasant adventures they managed to escape over the Indian borders (FCO37/895: 20 September 1971). Another evacuee, Mr Grech, who had lived in East Pakistan for many years could speak fluent Bengali and was found to be a very reliable reporter of the current scene to the official, described the same thing (FCO 37/888: 14 June 1971).
Lewis of Baptist Mission of Dinajpur was interviewed in London on 8 April. They told that in 28 March, inside the Mission compound troops on two sides stood up position and begun to fire each other. In Pakistan side it was nearly 500 and other side also well equipped with machine guns and rocket ejector. There had been looting by the Pakistan Army. They also told that many of the cattle which were vital for ploughing had been killed which might produce famine. Mr. Lloyd, of Sir Bruce white and partner, Chittagong, left on the Clanmacnair on 5 April, after two years working as a Consulting Engineer with the Yugoslav enterprise which was building the dry dock. Lloyd described Chittagong as dead town as the army gradually gained the control of the Chittagong town on 27 March, being utterly ruthless. He told that there had been considerable destruction although the central commercial area, Agrabad looked unharmed. The population had virtually all fled. Causalities in the fighting he estimated at a minimum 2,000-3,000 killed. Dead bodies lying in the streets were being eaten by dogs and vultures. The stench of bodies hanged over the docks and as the ship left the jetty the wash brought many bodies out from under it. During the fighting the army captured a Bengali arms factory in a hill near the main housing area. They also claimed to have captured 17,000 rifles from the police, who were nearly all killed.
Another couple Mr. and Mrs. Dickson of Rashidpur tea state, Sylhet left their estate in Sylhet on 25 March and after a journey of immense difficulties and staying in a village for a whole week from 27 March to 4 April, succeed to get the Clanmacnair on 5 April. They had witnessed widespread devastation of villages by the Pakistan Army. The town completely dead and there was certainly considerable destruction with a large number of dead bodies in the river. Dickson also added that when their train stopped near to Comilla, an American journalist on the town left it to take pictures and was shot and wounded by Pakistani army. Similarly, Pearson and Storrier, from Sylhet district crossed the border. They told about the food crisis and commented chaotic situation would become desperate. Their accounts have been of value in providing information about what had been happened outside and inside Dacca. Most of the statements carried the similar account about the bodies lying in the river or streets and ruthless behaviour of Pakistan Army.
Along with the Bengalis, some foreigners also had to face the Pakistan Army directly who were about to killed. Mr. Howie, a British Council staff on 25 March had gone with two other volunteer service overseas (VSO) for taking photographs of St. Thomas Cathedral in the old city of Dacca, Nawabpur. By this time, they saw that a car containing some Americans passed races into some trouble with Bihari. Sensing the danger, Howie put his camera away and they remained out of sight about a quarter of an hour inside the Church. But later the crowd accused them all of being Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents and spies and they were taken back to the Army headquarters in the old town of Dacca. They were asked to line up against the wall and a firing squad was in the process of preparing. Skelton, an American had arrived moment before the Pakistanis were to have executed these three British persons. He learned of the firing squad incident from one of the intended victims. So, he went directly to the Cantonment. Skelton carried on talking until he finally got them all free (FCO37/895: 16 April 1971; The Guardian, 5 April 1971). If Skelton did not have there then definitely Howie and other would be shot down. But later some European had to face death. British High Commission of Dacca sent the first authoritative report of the deliberate murder by army which he got through the Italian Fathers of the Roman Catholic Mission at Khulna. With two Pakistani Christian women one of their members also shot dead in the hospital compound (FCO 37/ 883, No. 251: 17 April 1971).
Despite an official declaration of normalcy and the relative calmness of Dacca, evidence had reached to British intelligence that a policy of uprooted of Hindus was still being cruelly pursued in the area south of Dacca and killing, looting, burning and raping was going on. So, F. C. D. Sergeant, criticized the ‘ferocious tactics’ of the army (FCO 37/883: 14 April 1971). In a similar way, Cyril Pickard (British High Commissioner to Islamabad) reported that, “the result of the army’s actions has undoubtedly generated a degree of hatred amongst the Bengalis for the army which will never permit the situation to return to normal” (FCO 37/884, No. 619: 22 April 1971). Another British High Commissioner (J. L. Pumphrey, Islamabad) criticized Pakistan government characterized the decision to use military force in East Pakistan as ‘an appalling miscalculation’ (FCO 37/930: 5 July 1971).
Findings
The British documents that discussed here show that, as part of their job, the British diplomats followed the usual political development of East Pakistan. But the ghoulish events of March 1971 certainly stunned them. Therefore, the situation in East Pakistan was being studied with close attention and the events of March got a wider coverage in their telegrams. From early March, they started to document the uprising in East Pakistan and the massacre of the 25 March shocked them as well. Causalities in different towns and reinforcement in East Pakistan issue had taken an important portion in their telegrams. To understand the gravity of the crisis, they tried to collect information on Military crackdown of 25 March night and after from different sources. Interview of evacuees was taken by the British intelligence to get the real picture of that area. All those telegrams reflected the concern and apprehension at the steady deterioration of the situation. Their telegrams described the army’s action on the populace, as well as their own thoughts and opinions on the crisis. Some of the diplomats criticized bluntly the Pakistan government for their deeds. The language used the diplomats in their telegrams showed that they were very displeased with the activities of Pakistan government. All those reports and telegrams are significant, because while the Pakistani authority claimed that they were just ‘restoring order’ in contrast these files are the evident of Pakistani army’s killing at that time. Their cable showed that the army’s aim was to suppress the nationalist movement completely, whatever the cost and by whatever means necessary.
Conclusion
Being in the vantage point British diplomats had the opportunity to assess the situation. In order to help policy makers to take appropriate courses of action and to keep the British government appraised, the British diplomats made great efforts to obtain the on-going turnover in Pakistan. FCO evaluated these observations and suggestions to frame government policy. Throughout the crisis Britain remained neutral based on the thought that it was Pakistan internal affairs and diplomatic intervention by Britain would be ineffective. Yet persuasion for negotiated settlement to Pakistan government was continued publicly and privately. But later on, a pro -Indian tilt was evident in the British government outlook. No doubt, this shifting attitude was influenced by all those telegrams, letters and reports sent by the diplomats from this region. Thus, those telegrams, letters and reports had a great influence on British policy making. Similarly, it had remained great documental evidences on that war as well as the relentless behaviour of Pakistan government.
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